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Commentary 

The Reemergence 
of Nuisance Law 
in Environmental 
Litigation 
By Alan Weinstein* 
In the summer of 1980, Chicago's beaches were fouled by raw 
and inadequately treated sewage, allegedly discharged into 
Lake Michigan by the Hammond (Indiana) Sanitary District. 
Clearly, Illinois and Chicago officials wanted to stop pollu­
tion of the lake. Surprisingly, they turned to the common law 
of nuisance, rather than to a regulatory agency or a statutory 
citizens' suit to obtain relief, charging the city of Hammond 
and the sanitary district with violations of the Illinois common 
law of nuisance. 
While planners are generally familiar with the application 
of common law nuisance doctrines to resolve disputes be­
tween conflicting uses of land, there is less familiarity with 
nuisance actions to abate environmental pollution. Yet prior 
to the enactment of comprehensive environmental regulations 
in the early 1970s, nuisance actions were used to challenge 
pollution of the air, water, and land by both industrial and 
municipal activity .1 Further, legislators and judges looked to 
nuisance law as a guide to the formulation and interpretation 
of new environmental regulations, in much the same way that 
nuisance doctrines provided the framework for zoning.2 In 
fact, in the early years of the environmental movement that 
emerged in the 1960s, nuisance law, along with a number of 
other legal doctrines, was touted as an effective way to deal 
with pollution problems. 3 • ,• 
The advocates of nuisance pomted out that economists 
definition of pollution as a negative externality fits well with 
nuisance doctrines concerning unreasonable interference with 
property rights; that nuisance, because of its historical associa­
•Alan Weinstein is an a ttomey and assistant professor of urban planning 
at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee. Larry Wolinsky, a third-year stu­
dent at New York Law School, provided research assistance. 
1. W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 100 (1977). 
2. In Village ofEuclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 36S (1926), the land­
mark Supreme Court case upholding the constitutionality of zoning regula­
tions, Justice Sutherland's opinion explicitly noted the role nuisance.law ~hould 
play in shaping the new law of zoning: "In solving doubts, the maxim szc utere 
tuo ut alien um non laedes, which lies at the foundation of so much of the com­
mon law of nuisances, ordinarily will furnish a fairly helpful clew. And the 
law of nuisances, likewise, may be consulted, not for the purpose of control­
ling, but for the helpful aid of its analogies in the process of ascertaining the 
scope of, the [zoning] power." 
3. See, e.g., Klipsch, Aspects ofConstitutional Rights to a Habitable En­
vironment: Towards an Environmental Due Process, 49 lNo.L.J. 203 (1974); 
Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, SB VA.L.REv.193 (1972); 
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Law: Effective Judicial Interven­
tion 68 M1cH.L.REv. 471 (1970); Bryson & Macbeth, Public Nuisance, the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, and Environmental Law, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 241 
(1971); McLaren, The Common Law Nuisance Actions and the Environmental 
Battle: We/I-Tempered Swords or Broken Reeds? 10 OsGOODE HALL L.J. SOS 
(1972). 
tion with equity jurisdiction, made injunctions readily 
available to halt polluting activities; and that the case-by-case 
approach of the common law, which judges each individual 
lawsuit on its own merits, would allow courts in nuisance ac­
tions to tailor remedies to the particular circumstances of each 
pollution episode. But nuisance also had serious shortcomings 
that limited its effectiveness to combat pollution, particular­
ly when compared with the comprehensive pollution control 
regulations provided by federal law. 
Unlike regulatory programs, which typically require per­
mits and periodic reporting to ensure compliance prospective­
ly, nuisance can only cure pollution retrospectively; there can 
be no nuisance action until a pollution episode has occurred. 
In contrast with regulatory agencies, which have a technical 
staff of scientists, engineers, and planners to fashion pollution 
control strategies, nuisance actions are heard in courts of 
general jurisdiction where few, if any, of the judges and 
lawyers have technical training. The case-by-case approach 
of nuisance law is also prohibitively expensive when com­
pared with regulatory programs that can address all like­
situated cases with a single set of regulations. 
The hallmark of the environmental legislation of the 1970s 
was a system of uniform national standards to control pollu­
tion. While this approach has been criticized by economists 
who favor various tax- or fee-based pollution control 
strategies, it has remained in place because of two distinct ad­
vantages: relative ease of administration and certainty. Under 
a uniform standard approach, both regulators and potential 
polluters know how much pollution must be abated, and com­
pliance may readily be monitored. If a polluter does not meet 
the standards specified in his permit, the regulatory remedy 
is an "enforcement action," usually prosecuted in state court, 
that will prescribe the steps the violator must take to achieve 
compliance. To avoid problems, the polluter need only meet 
the requirements of his permit. 
The availability of nuisance actions potentially conflicts 
with these legislative goals of uniformity, ease of administra­
tion, and certainty. A polluter sued on a nuisance claim, which 
is independent of the regulatory program, has no guarantee 
that his record of compliance with permit standards will earn 
a favorable ruling. This is not only unfair to the permit holder 
who complied in good faith with his permit only to find a 
nuisance action filed against him, but also can deter speedy 
compliance with permit standards, as polluters may delay 
meeting their permit obligations to see whether someone 
might initiate a nuisance lawsuit. 
On the other hand, nuisance law historically has served to 
"fill in the gaps" left by more comprehensive legislative 
schemes and, arguably, could still be used to remedy pollution 
problems overlooked by legislators and regulators. In 1980, 
Illinois could sue Hammond on federal and state common law 
nuisance grounds as well as federal and state statutory 
grounds. Today, that is no longer the case. In the past three 
years, a number of court decisions have redefined the relation­
ship among state and federal statutory and common law 
nuisance remedies for environmental pollution. In this article, 
we explore these developments and their implications for the 
future availability of common law nuisance as a remedy for 
pollution. 
Ironically, our exploration begins with an earlier Illinois 
allegation of out-of-state pollution of Lake Michigan. In 1972, 
Illinois charged that Milwaukee was polluting Lake Michigan 
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through the discharge of vast quantities of raw and inade­
quately treated sewage.4 Illinois initially brought suit against 
Milwaukee in the U.S. Supreme Court, charging Milwaukee 
with violating the federal common law of interstate water 
pollution. The motivation behind the Illinois nuisance action 
was undoubtedly the shortcomings of the then existing federal 
water pollution legislation. 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), first 
enacted in 1948 and substantially amended in 1956and1965, 
approached water pollution problems through ambient water 
quality standards tailored to particular bodies of water. 
Responsibility for developing and enforcing these standards 
rested with the states. Interstate water pollution became sub­
ject to FWPCA under the 1965 amendments, but the enforce­
ment process-a series of conferences that sought amicable 
settlements of pollution problems-was cumbersome and in­
efficient. The failure of this statutory interstate pollution 
abatement procedure led Illinois to invoke nuisance doctrines 
against Milwaukee. 
The Supreme Court, in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee 
(Milwaukee 1), 406 U.S. 91 (1972), declined to hear Illinois's 
suit, holding that Illinois could sue Milwaukee in federal 
district court un.der the federal common law of interstate water 
pollution. The Court's decision in Milwaukee I was a land­
mark because, for the first time, the Court expressly held that 
the federal common law of nuisance could govern an action 
concerning interstate water pollution. At the same time, the 
Court also recognized the potential for confict between such 
nuisance actions and statutory programs. Justice Douglas's 
opinion noted that: "It may happen that new federal laws and 
new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the field of 
federal common law of nuisance. But until that comes to pass, 
federal courts will be empowered to appraise the equities of 
suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by water 
pollution."5 
As Justice Douglas noted, a major issue in the conflict be­
tween common law and statutory remedies is the preemption 
doctrine. Preemption refers to the power a legislature has to 
exclude other remedies, such as common law nuisance, from 
an area of law that it has undertaken to regulate comprehen­
sively. Preemption may occur at the federal or state levels. 
There may be federal preemption of federal common law, 
federal preemption of state statutory law, or state preemption 
of local regulation or state common law. In Milwaukee I, the 
preemption issue had been whether the then existing FWPCA 
would preempt Illinois's federal common law claims against 
Milwaukee, and the Court ruled against preemption, allow­
ing Illinois to sue Milwaukee under the federal common law 
of nuisance. Accordingly, on May 19, 1972, Illinois filed its 
complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois, seeking abatement of the Milwaukee 
sewage discharges under the federal common law of nuisance. 
Five months later, Congress, recognizing that "the Federal 
water pollution control program ... has been inadequate in 
every vital aspect,"6 enacted a comprehensive reform of the 
4. Illinois, in fact, named as defendants not only the City of Milwaukee, 
but the cities of Kenosha, Racine, and South Milwaukee, Wisconsin; the 
Sewerage Commission of the City of Milwaukee; and the Metropolitan 
Sewerage Commission of Milwaukee County. Kenosha, Racine, and South 
Milwaukee subsequently settled out of court. 
5. 406 U.S. at 107. 
6. City ofMilwaukeev. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451U.S.304at310 (1981). 
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FWPCA that made it illegal for anyone to discharge pollutants 
into navigable waterways without a permit. Milwaukee, com­
plying with the new requirement, received permits from the 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR), which 
had qualified as a permit-granting agency under FWPCA. The 
question posed in Douglas's opinion was now squarely at 
issue. Would this new comprehensive statutory program 
preempt the newly created federal common law of nuisance? 
Milwaukee raised the preemption issue on a motion to 
dismiss the Illinois complaint but the motion was denied in Il­
linois v. Milwaukee, 366 F.Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill. 1973), allow­
ing the Illinois nuisance lawsuit to remain before the court. 
After three years of discovery, trial commenced in January 
1977. While this trial on the nuisance claim was proceeding in 
federal district court, the Wisconsin DNR initiated an enforce­
ment action against Milwaukee in state court-asprovided for 
in the FWPCA-alleging that the city was not fully comply­
ing with its permit requirements. In May 1977, the state court 
entered a judgment requiring that Milwaukee's sewage 
discharges meet the effluent limitations stated in the DNR per­
mits and establishing a detailed timetable for the construction 
of a system to control overflows of raw sewage into Lake 
Michigan.7 Less than six months later, the federal district 
court issued its own judgment order. The federal court found 
that Milwaukee's sewage discharges constituted a nuisance 
under federal common law and ordered Milwaukee to meet 
effluent limitations well beyond those specified by the DNR 
permits and to adhere to an even more stringent timetable to 
correct the overflow problem.8 
The potential conflict between statute and nuisance was 
now fully realized. Milwaukee in late 1977 faced two separate 
court-imposed mandates, one based on the statutory 
guidelines under FWPCA, the other founded on the novel 
claims of the federal common law of nuisance. Two years 
later, the Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, ruling on 
Milwaukee's appeal of the district court's judgment, closed the 
distance between the statutory and common law remedies 
somewhat, but upheld the lower court's finding that the 1972 
amendments to the FWPCA had not preempted the federal 
common law of nuisance .9 Other federal courts faced with 
the preemption issue also held that the FWPCA left in­
tact the federal common law of nuisance enunciated in 
Milwaukee J.10 
Milwaukee continued its fight, however, and was granted 
a second hearing by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1980. In April 
7. Sewerage Commission v. State (Dane Cty. Cir. Ct. of Wis. No. 
152-1342, May 25, 1977). The overflows of raw sewage were caused by the 
limited hydraulic capacity of a combined system of storm and sanitary sewers 
in older sections of Milwaukee. In wet weather, the increased flows of storm­
water overloaded the combined sewers, which also carried human waste. To 
prevent sewage from backing up into homes, the combined sewer system con­
tained a number of overflow outlets that relieved the pressure by discharg­
ing flows of stormwater and raw sewage directly into streams and Lake 
Michigan, bypassing the treatment facilities entirely. 
8. Illinoisv. Milwaukee, N.D. Ill. No. 72-C-1253, ("Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law," July 29, 1977) (Judgment Order, November 15, 1977). 
9. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F .2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979). The court ruled that 
Milwaukee did not have to go beyond the effluent limits specified in the DNR 
permits, stating that "[i]n applying the federal common law of nuisance in a 
water pollution case, a court should not ignore the Act but should look at its 
policies and principles for guidance." Id. at 164. The lower court's stringent 
timetable for correction of overflows was left in place, however. 
10. See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 340 n.9. 
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1981, nine years after Milwaukee I created the federal com­
mon law of nuisance for interstate water pollution, the 
Supreme Court, in Milwaukee//, held that the 1972 amend­
ments to the FWPCA preempted the federal common law of 
nuisance. The case has received substantial comment11 and we 
will not attempt here to provide a critical analysis of the ma­
jority and dissenting opinions. Our focus is rather on the ef­
fect this decision is having-and is likely to have-on pollu­
tion abatement actions based on federal and state common 
law nuisance theories. 
Will the Common Law of Nuisance Survive Milwaukee II? 
The Supreme Court's decision in Milwaukee II raised a 
number of important issues about the future of environmen­
tal common law nuisance actions. Three of the more signifi­
cant issues are: What is the scope of Milwaukee II as it applies 
to the FWPCA? What is the impact of Milwaukee II on federal 
common law of nuisance actions brought in areas governed 
by environmental legislation other than the FWPCA? Have 
state as well as federal common law of nuisance remedies been 
preempted by environmental legislation? The remainder of 
this article exmaines how the courts are resolving these 
questions. 
The Scope of Milwaukee II as Applied to the FWPCA 
The decision in Milwaukee II left unclear whether the FWPCA 
completely preempted the federal common law of nuisance in 
the field of water pollution. However, this confusion was 
short-lived. Just two months after Milwaukee II, the Supreme 
Court decision in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. 
National Sea ClammersAssociation, 453 U.S. 1(1981),33 ZD 
255, answered the question. In Sea Clammers, a group of com­
mercial fishermen, suing under the federal common law of 
nuisance and other theories, alleged that the defendant was 
polluting fishing grounds in the Atlantic Ocean and thereby 
causing them economic harm. The Court rejected the 
fishermen's federal common law of nuisance claim, holding 
that Milwaukee II was to be read as "entirely" preempting the 
federal common law of nuisance in the area of water pollution. 
Lower federal court decisions have further defined the reach 
of Milwaukee II in nuisance actions that conflict with the 
FWPCA. In United States v. Olin, 11 ENVTL. L. REP. 21026 
(D.C. Ala. 1981), the United States brought a federal common 
law nuisance action seeking to abate discharges of DDT. At 
issue was whether Milwaukee II and Sea Clammers were ap­
plicable to nonpoint- as well as point-source discharges. The 
court, after extensively quoting from Milwaukee II, effectively 
held that the FWPCA was comprehensive enough to preempt 
federal common law nuisance actions against nonpoint­
source polluters. 
In People of Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 680 F .2d 473 
(7th Cir. 1982), the retroactivity of Milwaukee II was at issue. 
The court examined the FWPCA' s legislative history and con­
cluded that Congress, in enacting the 1972 amendments, had 
considered the residual effects of pre-1972 discharges. Thus, 
11. See, e.g., City ofMilwaukeev. Illinois(l//inoisll), lOEcoLOGYL.Q.51 
(1982); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois: The Demise ofFederal Common Law 
Nuisance Actions in Interstate Water Pollution Disputes, 35 S.W. L.J. 1097 
(1982); Environmental Law: States May No Longer Bring a Federal Common 
Law Nuisance Action to Abate Interstate Water Pollution. 7 U.DAYTON L. REv. 
511 (1982); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois: The Demise of the Federal Com­
mon Law of Water Pollution, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 627. 
the federal common law of nuisance could not survive as a 
cause of action for water pollution incidents prior to 1972, 
since Congress expressly intended the FWPCA to govern past 
as well as future pollution episodes. 
The Impact of Milwaukee II on the Relationship of Federal 
Common Law to Other Pollution Statutes. 
Although Milwaukee II and Sea Clammers clearly established 
that the FWPCA preempts a federal common law of nuisance 
action brought against a water polluter, they did not address 
the status of federal common law nuisance actions brought 
against an air polluter or landfill operator. Are these actions 
also preempted by the relevant federal statutes, the Clean Air 
Act (CAA) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA)? The courts have begun to address these questions 
and are beginning to determine what remains of the federal 
common law of nuisance after Milwaukee II. 
The Clean Air Act 
In New England Legal Foundation v. Cost le, 666 F .2d 30 (2d 
Cir. 1981), 34ZD140, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief against the Long Island Lighting Co. based on 
violations of the CAA and the federal common law of 
nuisance. Although the Second Circuit's holding did not ad­
dress whether the CAA totally preempted federal nuisance ac­
tions, the court in dictum intimated that federal common law 
nuisance actions involving air pollution might be looked at 
differently from actions to abate water pollution. Specifical­
ly, the court noted that the CAA differs substantially from the 
FWPCA since under the FWPCA the EPA regulates every 
point source of water pollution but under the CAA, the states 
and the EPA are only required to control those sources of air 
pollution that threaten ambient air quality standards. By 
noting these differences, the court implied that the CAA is not 
as "all comprehensive" as the FWPCA and for that reason 
might not "entirely" preclude a federal common law of 
nuisance action to abate an air polluter. 
In contrast to New England Legal Foundation, the court in 
United States v. Kin-Bue, Inc., 532 F.Supp. 699 (D.N.J.1982), 
34 ZD 266, held that the CAA does totally preclude a federal 
common law of nuisance action. In this case, the United States 
sought damages under the federal common law of nuisance for 
air and water pollution emanating from a landfill. Defendants 
moved for summary judgment with respect to the air pollu­
tion claim, arguing that the FWPCA and CAA were "sister 
statutes," and that in light of Milwaukee II the CAA must 
therefore logically preclude a federal common law of nuisance 
action. The court rejected this argument by stressing the dif­
ferences between the two acts. However, the court also re­
jected the idea that th-e absence of a direct conflict between the 
CAA and the federal common law means that a federal com­
mon law action can be maintained. Citing Milwaukee II, the 
court said that the proper test to apply "is whether the scope 
of the legislative scheme established by Congress is such that 
it addresses the problems formerly governed by federal com­
mon law." The court then examined the legislative history of 
the CAA and concluded that it establishes a complete 
regulatory procedure that, when administered by an expert 
agency, obviates the need for federal common law. Thus, 
''since Congress addressed the problem of air pollution in the 
CAA that statute preempts a federal common law claim for 
nuisance." 
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RCRA 
The effect of RCRA on the federal common law of nuisance 
has also been at issue in recent cases. In U.S. v. Price, 523 
F.Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), the United States sought an in­
junction to remedy hazards posed by chemical dumping, 
bringing the action under the federal common law of nuisance 
as well as other theories. The court, relying on Milwaukee I, 
held that the chemical dumping was intrastate in all respects 
and therefore there was no proper basis for development of 
federal common law in this area. The court nevertheless 
elected to address the preemption issue and stated that: 
. . . even if this was an appropriate area for federal common 
law, any such common law has been preempted by the enact­
ment of RCRA and more recently the Comprehensive Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CRCLA) ... The 
comprehensive nature of the schemes established by RCRA and 
CRCLA require us to conclude that if federal common law ever 
governed this type of activity it has since been preempted by 
those statutes. 
Is There Still a State Common Law of Nuisance for 
Pollution Episodes Governed by Federal Environmental 
Legislation? 
We now can see that the federal courts will no longer allow 
lawsuits based on the federal common law of nuisance where 
there is a comprehensive federal pollution control statute. But 
what about lawsuits based on state common law of nuisance? 
The constitutional test for showing preemption of state law 
differs significantly from that for preemption of federal com­
mon laws. Thus, the fact that Milwaukee II and subsequent 
cases found that comprehensive statutory programs to abate 
pollution preempt the federal common law of nuisance does 
not necessarily mean that state common law actions are also 
preempted. The federal courts that have considered state com­
mon law of nuisance laws since Milwaukee II are split on the 
issue. 
The litigation between Illinois and Hammond illustrates the 
differing views the federal courts have taken. Three separate 
lawsuits charged Hammond with violating the Illinois com­
mon law of nuisance. The first two lawsuits, filed by the state 
of Illinois and Illinois's former Attorney General, William 
Scott, were decided together in Scott v. City of Hammond, 
519 F.Supp. 292 (N.D. Ill.1981), 34ZD11. In Scott, the court 
ruled that state common law of nuisance claims were not 
preempted by the FWPCA. In reaching this decision, the court 
stated that "where there is no separate common law but only 
federal statutory law, the statute must be examined to deter­
mine whether Congress intended to make these pollution con­
trol matters solely a federal question." 
Since the FWPCA expressly allows states to adopt and en­
force standards more stringent than the statutory re­
quirements, and also provides for''citizen suits" that expressly 
reserve "any right which any person (or class of persons) may 
have under any statute or common law," the court argued that 
Congress could not have intended to make interstate pollution 
control solely a federal matter. The court dismissed Ham­
mond's argument that the FWPCA preempted both federal 
and state common law by noting the differing standards for 
preemption: "Hammond's arguments concerning preemption 
do not withstand analysis. When the Milwaukee II Court 
described the scope of federal legislation it did so in the con­
text of determining whether federal legislation replaced federal 
6 March 1984 Land Use Law 
common law. The Court expressly recognized that the test for 
that displacement was less demanding than the clear intent test 
for preemption of state law." 
But in the third lawsuit in the Hammond litigation, brought 
by the Chicago Park District, the court held that the FWPCA 
did preempt both federal andstate common law of nuisance. 
Chicago Park District v. Sanitary District ofHammond, 530 
F.Supp. 291 (N.D. Ill. 1981). This court argued that: "It would 
be bizarre to hold that state law claims against out-of-state 
dischargers were preempted by federal common law but not 
by the comprehensive federal statute that has in turn pre­
empted that federal common law. Uniformity in the interstate 
regulation of pollution is a concern of the same magnitude 
whatever form the federal response may take." In this deci­
sion, the court clearly relied on the reasoning of Milwaukee 
I that "Federal common law and not the varying common law 
of the individual States is, we think, entitled and necessary to 
be recognized as a basis for dealing in uniform standard with 
the environmental rights of a State against improper impair­
ment by sources outside its domain." Although these con­
flicting decisions have been appealed to the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals, that court still has not rendered a decision, 
leaving Illinois's common law claims against Hammond still 
in dispute. 
Where Are We? 
In the three years since the Supreme Court's ruling in 
Milwaukee II, some trends have emerged. First, it is clear that 
the federal common law of nuisance may no longer be the 
basis for a lawsuit to abate interstate water pollution. Second, 
although relatively few cases have considered whether the 
federal common law of nuisance may be used to challenge air 
pollution or solid and hazardous waste problems, the courts 
are generally barring nuisance lawsuits for alleged RCRA or 
Clean Air violations. 
When we consider the availability of state common law of 
nuisance lawsuits, there is no clear trend to be discerned. The 
litigation between Illinois and Hammond has gone both ways 
on the issue, and the Seventh Circuit has not yet decided 
whether state law has been preempted. It is quite possible that 
the courts will adopt a "middle ground," neither wholly 
preempting nor wholly permitting state common law of 
nuisance lawsuits, but rather restricting nuisance lawsuits to 
damage claims. Under this "middle ground" theory, a court 
would hold that comprehensive pollution control legislation 
would preempt state common law of nuisance actions that 
sought to enforce stricter standards than those mandated by 
environmental regulations, but would allow nuisance lawsuits 
'that sought damages for alleged pollution episodes. 
This "middle ground" has already been suggested by one 
federal court. In Chappel v. SCA Services, 540 F.Supp. 
1087 (C.D. Ill. 1982) residents of Wilsonville, Illinois, were 
seeking to recover damages for property losses and personal 
injuries that resulted from the operation of a hazardous waste 
landfill. The federal court, although remanding the case to the 
Illinois state courts for lack of federal jurisdiction, noted that 
the citizen suit provisions of federal pollution control statutes 
apparently did not provide any right to damages for private 
citizens injured by pollutant discharges. Since the federal com­
mon law of nuisance was clearly preempted by federal 
statutory law, a state common law nuisance action may thus 
be the only way that plaintiffs can recover for any damages 
Commentary 

they have suffered. In this situation, the court reasoned that 
state common law nuisance actions for damages were not 
preempted by federal pollution control statutes. 
Conclusion 
In the past decade, we have witnessed the birth, growth, and 
now, apparently, the demise of the common law of nuisance 
as an alternative to federal statutory remedies for pollution. 
While nuisance was a potentially useful approach to particular 
pollution problems, its costs, the uncertainty of outcomes in 
nuisance litigation, and most critically, the potential for con­
flict between standards mandated by statute and standards 
derived from nuisance lawsuits are powerful policy argu­
ments for the preemption of the common law of nuisance 
by comprehensive federal environmental legislation. 
These policy arguments are far less compelling when we 
consider common law nuisance as a means for recovering 
damages for private plaintiffs harmed by polluters. A nuisance 
action for damages alone does not conflict with statutory 
policy where the alleged harm was caused by a polluter's viola­
tion of federally mandated standards. The courts may find it 
more difficult to weigh the equities where damages are sought 
for harms caused by discharges or emissions expressly permit­
ted under those same standards, but allowing such actions 
could further the aims of environmental policy. Since the 
plaintiffs in such actions-challenging a legislatively permit­
ted activity-would face a very high burden of proof, we 
should not expect a flood of such litigation. The few cases that 
were brought might then prove very useful by increasing our 
sophistication regarding pollution costs. In this way, nuisance 
law could continue to serve its historical equity function 
without causing undue conflict in our environmental policy, 
but at the same time it could slowly influence that policy by 
developing a body of knowledge regarding pollution costs 
derived from the resolution of individual cases. 
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